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ABSTRACT
Tracing activity in 15 Indian state assemblies from 1967 to 2007, we find that overall
legislative activity declined but there was also considerable variation across states.
States with large electoral constituencies and politically fragmented assemblies
showed the worst performance, which suggests a link between political fragmenta-
tion and institutional performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Federalism in India has a vibrant and distinguished history. India’s experiment
with democracy began with a series of legislative and electoral reforms that
occurred simultaneously at the national and provincial levels under British rule,
leading to a thriving federal democracy in the post-independence period.1
In this article we explore the activity of the legislative assemblies in 15 Indian
states from 1967 to 2007, based on a unique dataset collected from state
assembly archives. We study these legislative institutions because we believe
they are the key to understanding provincial-level state capacity development in
India. ‘‘State capacity’’ refers to the institutional ability of the state to maintain
law and order, enact various developmental policies, and deliver goods,
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beneﬁts, and services to households and ﬁrms.2 Province-level governments in
India have long determined legislation on a range of important policy issues
such as land reforms and land taxes, as well as the administration of law and
order and the provision of local public goods.
Since the 1991 national economic crisis and subsequent reforms, deregu-
lation and economic liberalization have only served to increase the impor-
tance of state politics. State governments now have greater autonomy in
dictating local economic policies; they get a signiﬁcant proportion of their
budgets through state-level taxes; and they play an increasingly important
role in implementing national policy agendas. Yet, states diverge considerably
in their ability to perform these critical economic and developmental roles.
Studying state legislative institutions may help explain why states show such
variation in performance. Descriptive analysis of the legislative activity in
these assemblies over time reveals two interesting patterns: ﬁrst, there is
considerable variation in the activity of state assemblies across states; and
second, despite this variation, there has been an overall decline in legislative
activity in Indian state assemblies over time. Why do such differences arise?
In much of the political-science literature, the expectation is that career-
oriented politicians seeking re-election will try to make their mark by passing
legislation that is important for their constituents.3 From this perspective,
greater political fragmentation and competition should contribute to more
debate and dialogue as well as the enhancement of legislative professionalism
as the legislative body becomes a vehicle for political opportunism. In India,
however, the converse holds true. Although politics in Indian states has
grown more competitive and fragmented in recent decades as the dominance
of the Indian National Congress (INC) party has gradually broken down,4 we
ﬁnd that overall activity in India’s state assemblies has decreased. Correlating
the activities of the assemblies with how fragmented they are, we ﬁnd that the
legislative assemblies dominated by a single party have tended to have far
more legislative debate than the more fragmented assemblies.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that states with smaller electoral constituencies tend to
have more active assemblies. Politicians in India are expected to help their
2. Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Devel-
opment Clusters (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
3. See e.g. David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1974).
4. R. Kothari, ‘‘The ‘Congress System’ in India,’’ Asian Survey 4 (1964), pp. 1161–73.
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voters in practical matters by negotiating with the local administrative
bureaucracy, attending local social functions, and networking with inﬂuential
people. Many observers argue that for re-election, these activities are more
important to politicians than their actions in the legislature. From our ﬁnd-
ings, it seems that when politicians have to cater to a large electorate at home,
they may prioritize spending time in their constituency rather than in meet-
ings in the assembly, which could be associated with less legislative activity.
This suggests that the size of the units of political representation can help
explain the variation in legislative activity in the Indian legislatures.
This article makes several contributions. First, we present a unique dataset
on the workings of state legislatures in India over time. Based on archival
work, we have created annual measures of legislative activity for 140 assem-
blies in 15 states between 1967 and 2007. This dataset allows us to compare
the legislative activities in different states as well as to examine patterns across
the states over time. Second, in seeking to explain why and where there has
been more legislative activity, we ﬁnd a strong relationship between the
competitiveness of elections and the activity of the assemblies. These ﬁndings
are not only of interest for understanding the workings of India’s state
assemblies; they can also shed light on why there has been an overall and
steady decline in the meeting activity of the Indian national parliament over
time. While some have argued that this is the result of a general deterioration
in political culture, we propose that the explanation may lie in the growth in
political fragmentation and increasing pressures on politicians in their home
constituencies.
2. ASSEMBLIES IN INDIA
While India is often celebrated as a thriving and robust democracy, with its
enormous electorate and heavily contested elections, there is growing concern
that greater political participation has been accompanied by a decline in the
quality of political institutions including the professionalization of the
national parliament and political parties. As can be seen in Figure 1, there
has been a steady decline in the number of sittings in both houses of the
national parliament.
Politicians and media alike have lamented the decline in the activities of
parliament. In 2001, the All India Conference of Presiding Ofﬁcers, Chief
Ministers, Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Leaders and Whips of Parties
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called for immediate steps to be taken to ensure that the parliament meets for
at least 110 days every year.5 However, Figure 1 suggests that this decision has
not had much effect.
The issue was raised again in May 2012, when the Indian parliament cele-
brated its 60th anniversary. On this occasion, India’s vice president and the
chairman of the upper house, M. Hamid Ansari, addressed the house and
stated that while much had been achieved, there seemed to be ‘‘declining
efﬁciency’’ in the parliament’s oversight of the executive and in its deliberations
and lawmaking: ‘‘The institutional mechanisms and procedural norms for
ensuring accountability are being progressively underused. There is a percepti-
ble drop in the working days of the parliament. Deliberation is less frequent;
legislation is at times hasty.’’6 Yet, despite the coverage of this decline in the
national media, little is known about why it has happened. Examining the
meeting activity of India’s state assemblies might help show what factors have
led to the decline in legislative activity in the national parliament as well.
figure 1. Sessions in the Lok Sabha (lower house) and Rajya Sabha (upper house) over time.
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DATA SOURCE: Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Statistical Handbook of 2012, <http://mpa.nic.in/mpa/
Pdf/statbook12.pdf>.
5. Reported by PRS Legislative Research on the occasion of the 60th anniversary; report available
at <http://www.prsindia.org>.
6. ‘‘Address of M. Hamid Ansari at the Historic Commemoration Function of the 60th Anni-
versary of the ﬁrst sitting of Parliament,’’ Press Information Bureau of India, May 13, 2012, <http://
pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?Relid¼83690>.
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The Indian states have come to serve an increasingly important role in
Indian political life. In an evaluation of the Indian national elections in 2009,
Yadav and Palshikar argue that state-level politics has emerged as the most
important arena in Indian politics, and that the political dynamics in each
state not only lead to drastically different political outcomes across the coun-
try but also shape national politics.7 In a seminal paper, Chhibber and Koll-
man argued that it was the growing decentralization in the post-liberalization
period—following 1991—that made Indian states such important arenas of
political contestation, resulting in fragmentation of the national party sys-
tem.8 Together, these studies suggest that politics at the state level is instru-
mental in shaping the political landscape in India.
State governments in India have clearly delineated areas of public policy
over which they are to legislate, including taxation on land and agriculture;
taxation on goods, services, and entertainment; provision of public goods
such as schools, the police, and hospitals; and programs for developmental
and non-developmental schemes.9 Given the growing importance of state-
level taxation to state budgets and of state-level economic strategies to indus-
trial and trade development since 1991, the study of the legislative bodies
responsible for these policies takes on greater importance.
Each Indian state has a state assembly that meets to consider state-related
legislation. Assemblies vary in size according to the size of the state; assem-
blies in the smallest states have only 30members, while the assembly of Uttar
Pradesh currently has 403 members.10 The governor of each state is respon-
sible for summoning the assembly no more than six months after the end of
the previous session. Once in session, however, it is largely up to the house
leadership, comprising the dominant party and its ministerial cabinet, to
decide how long discussions will continue and how many days it will meet.
7. Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, ‘‘Principal State Level Contests and Derivative National Choices:
Electoral Trends in 2004–09,’’ Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 6 (Feb. 7–13, 2009), pp. 55–62.
8. P. Chhibber and K. Kollman, ‘‘Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the
United States,’’ American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 329–42.
9. State governments routinely institute a diverse range of programs, such as midday meal
schemes for school children to encourage school attendance, vocational training programs, and aid to
victims of natural disasters.
10. According to the Constitution, part VI, chapter III, on State Legislatures, each assembly is to
have at least 60 members, but Sikkim, Goa, and Mizoram have been allowed smaller assemblies
through acts of parliament.
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The state assembly buildings are located in the state capitals, and are
usually magniﬁcent structures. Visiting different state assemblies between
summer 2009 and spring 2011, the authors observed great variation in how
well-kept the assemblies were, how open they were to the public, the quality
of their staff, and how much effort was put into keeping good records of
historical debates. In particular we noted how different they were in terms of
access for the public. In some places, like Bangalore and Lucknow, the
assembly areas were fenced in and heavily guarded as a security measure.
Here we could not enter without an appointment, and the gates had long
lines of people trying to get into the premises.11 This gave a hostile impression
that visitors were not welcome into the legislature. In other states, such as
Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, the assemblies were more accessible.
Another striking difference was the quality of archives and personnel. The
archive in Punjab was an example of a very well-organized assembly library. It
had dark wooden furniture and nicely bound books that all seemed to be in
order. Library records were kept in Hindi, Punjabi, and English. The head
librarian, at the time of our visit, had worked in the legislature for several
years and had an excellent overview of the collection. She quickly supplied us
with the volumes we needed for our research and let us work in an air-
conditioned reading room normally reserved for politicians. We were told
that politicians often came to consult old debates and other library resources
in order to prepare for debates. According to the librarian, many politicians
showed interest in doing proper research about proposed bills, including
looking up historical discussions about policy issues.
That was not the story we heard in other assemblies. In the Uttar
Pradesh assembly, several of the staff lamented that the quality of debate
had deteriorated over the years. They claimed that politicians used to be
more educated and were more interested in doing research before legislative
sessions. Staff members also felt that, with the state bureaucracy becoming
increasingly corrupt, people were placing more demands on politicians for
help with bureaucratic issues. Politicians have therefore become too busy
attending to their constituents to spend time preparing for legislative
debates.
11. In both these states, the authors tried to gain access to the assembly archives, carrying letters
conﬁrming that we were academics, but we were shown away. We were able to get in only after
establishing connections with someone working in the secretariat, who then granted us access.
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Ofﬁcially, the main task of local Indian politicians is to represent their
constituents in the state assembly. In reality, however, the work in the
legislative assembly is a minor part of their work. For example, in an extensive
survey of Indian state assembly politicians, Chopra reports that only 3%
reported assembly work as the task on which they spent the most time.12
A politician in Uttar Pradesh told one of the authors that, in his experience,
constituents do not care about what politicians do in the assembly but only
about how the politicians are part of their daily happiness and sorrow (sukh
aur dukh). He went on to claim that he would be able to win an election
simply by attending funerals and weddings.13
In each of the assemblies we visited, we examined some of the legislative
debates and collected data about when the assembly met, how many days it
met for, how many hours members sat, and how many bills were introduced
and passed in each session between 1967 and 2007. Interestingly, the quality
of the staff and the archives seemed to reﬂect the activities of the assembly in
that state. In the assembly archives of Haryana, the materials were untidy and
the debate reports for many years were either arranged haphazardly or stacked
in large piles. In addition to its library’s being the most chaotic we visited, it
was clear from the records that the Haryana legislature was the assembly in
India with the shortest meetings, the fewest total meeting hours, and the least
discussion about bills. In contrast, in Andhra Pradesh, the archival materials
of the assembly were kept in perfect order in a beautiful building adjacent to
the assembly meeting room, and the library had plenty of study desks avail-
able for politicians and researchers to consult the library materials.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the activities of the legislative assemblies in
Haryana and Andhra Pradesh diverge dramatically. Because of the constitu-
tional requirement of reconvening within six months of the last session, the
ofﬁcial number of sessions per year is very similar in the two states. However,
closer examination of those sessions reveals some clear differences. While
both states have an average of 2.5 sessions per year, the Haryana assembly
met for an average of only 17.4 days per year between 1967 and 2007, whereas
the Andhra Pradesh assembly met for 47.4 days per year, on average. In many
cases, assemblies also cut their working days short, meeting for just a few
12. V. K. Chopra,Marginal Players in Marginal Assemblies: The Indian MLA (New Delhi: Orient
Longman, 1996), p. 151.
13. Interview by Jensenius in Lucknow, November 24, 2010.
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hours. In Haryana, the assembly met for an average of only 65 hours per year,
whereas that in Andhra Pradesh met for an average of 265 hours per year.
This is not to say that the assembly in Haryana did not pass legislation—
but that legislation was passed quickly and often without any actual debate.
That in turn means that the state government in power institutes policies
without much opposition or public discussion. While the average number of
days spent discussing and passing bills was low in Haryana throughout the
40 years under investigation, there was a lot of change in Andhra Pradesh.
Here bills were discussed at length during the ﬁrst years in the sample, and
there was a clear reduction in the time spent on each bill in later years. This is
because the assembly started dealing with more bills per session over time,
figure 2. Comparing legislative activity in Haryana and in Andhra Pradesh, 1967–2007.
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and there was also a decline in the number of days it met per year. This
comparison reveals two clear trends. First, there is great variation in legislative
activity across state assemblies in India; second, there has been a decline in
legislative activity over time. But is this a pattern in other states as well? And if
so, what can explain the pattern?
3. VARIATION IN LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY ACROSS THE STATES
To measure legislative activity, we collected data from the assemblies in 15
of India’s largest states about when the assembly met, how many days it
met, how many hours its members sat, and how many bills were introduced
and passed in each session between 1967 and 2007.14 This information is
usually recorded in the publication of the debates of the state assemblies,
but it is also often summarized in separate publications called bulletins,
journals, or resumes.15 For most of the 15 states we were able to get a com-
plete record of numbers of sessions (meetings) and sittings (days of the
meeting), but we were not able to get complete data for the number of
hours the assemblies met or the bills that were dealt with. In this section we
will therefore focus on a comparative analysis of the number of sessions and
sittings.16
Looking at the data for all 15 states over time, we note some clear overall
patterns. First, take the number of sessions per year in each state, as shown in
Figure 3. In the ﬁgure, the gray shapes show the distribution of the number of
sessions by state. For example, in 1967 there were three states that had held
14. The authors personally collected data from the state assemblies in Andhra Pradesh, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh. In the case of Orissa and Bihar we
obtained data about the activities in the assemblies by sending research assistants to the State
Assembly Archives. In Rajasthan we got data from researchers working with the Association for
Democratic Reform, and we are very grateful to them for this help. In the case of Gujarat, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra we got data through right to information requests. For West Bengal
and Madhya Pradesh we did not get responses to our right to information requests. In this case we
ﬁlled in as much information about the activities as we were able to from parliamentary summary
reports of state legislative activity.
15. In most states these publications were made both in the local language and in English for most
of the period under study. The choice of language in the reports seems to have been political. For
example, in Himachal Pradesh the reports were published only in Hindi during the late 1970s, and
the librarians suggested that this must be because Jana Sangh got to power for the ﬁrst time then.
16.We also read some of the debates in each of the assemblies we visited, and while it would have
been very interesting to compare the quality of the debates that took place during these sittings, that
is beyond the scope of this article.
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only one session, six states that had held two sessions, three states with three
sessions, and one state that had held four sessions. Across the whole period,
there have been states that have held no sessions or only one session in a year
(this has often been because of emergency procedures, such as President’s
Rule, resulting in a disruption of legislative activity), and others that have
held more.17 The horizontal black line for each year indicates the average
number of sessions across all the states that year. Across the whole period
studied, these states held an average of 2.5 sessions per year (with a median of
2), and, as can be seen from the trend line, there has been an overall weak
increase in the number of sessions per year over time, with an overall average
increase of 0.7 sessions across the years.18
Because of the constitutional requirement to meet, the number of sessions
says little about how much the assembly actually met during each year.
Figure 4 shows the number of sittings of each of the assemblies each year.
A sitting usually lasts for one day—although sometimes the assembly may
figure 3. Number of sessions in 15 state legislative assemblies in India, 1967–2007.
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17. Under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, the central government can take direct control of
a state if the government in that state is not able to function as per the Constitution. This has happened
when legislatures have been unable to support a Chief Minister, when a government coalition has
broken down, when elections in the state have had to be postponed, and sometimes when there has
been political disagreement between the state government and the central government.
18. The trend line is a bivariate regression line of number of sessions across the states over time.
The coefﬁcient is 0.02, suggesting an average increase of 0.02 sessions every year.
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meet for only a few hours that day—and this data therefore gives a more
accurate impression of the actual meeting activity. Again, the gray shapes
show the distribution of the values for the states. In most cases the dots
represent how many sittings one particular state had, since few states hap-
pened to have exactly the same number of sittings in a year.
Figure 4 shows the considerable variation in the number of sittings in
different states, ranging from 0 to 103 sittings in a year (these states were
Andhra Pradesh under President’s Rule in 1973 and Uttar Pradesh in
1972, respectively). It is perhaps not surprising that there are differences
among states. As mentioned, assemblies vary greatly in size, and the
number of members may in itself affect the length of meetings (size of
assembly and number of sittings in a year are positively correlated, with
a Pearson’s r of 0.22). States also have different political traditions and
cultures. But while such differences across states have remained fairly
constant, there has been an overall pattern of decline in the number of
sittings over time. The trend line through the data shows an average drop
of about 11 sittings (24%) over the whole period studied (from 45 sittings
per year to 34, on average).
Figure 5 shows the average number of sittings and the average yearly
change in the number of sittings over time for each of the 15 states in our
sample, for 1967–2007. The point estimates for the changes are the
figure 4. Number of sittings in 15 state legislative assemblies in India, 1967–2007.
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coefﬁcients from state-wise bivariate regressions, regressing the yearly number
of sittings on time. The conﬁdence intervals are also from these bivariate
regression models. As is apparent in the ﬁgure, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and
West Bengal have seen an increase in the number of sittings per year; the
number has remained fairly constant over time in Kerala and Himachal
Pradesh; and there has been a decrease in all the other states studied. Mahar-
ashtra had the highest average number of days, with an average of 57.5 sittings
per year, but it has also experienced the largest average decline, with a drop of
about one day per year between 1967 and 2007 (a decline of about 40 days
during the whole period). What can explain these different patterns?
figure 5. Average number of sittings and the average yearly change in the number of sittings,
1967–2007.
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4. EXPLAINING THE VARIATION IN MEETING ACTIVITY
To try to explain these differences in legislative activity, we focus on the
attributes of the individual legislative assemblies that came to power in the
states over the 40-year period. When the annual legislative data were col-
lapsed into unique assemblies, they comprised 140 individual assemblies in
the 15 states, with between 8 and 10 different assemblies coming to power in
each state in the sample. This dataset is therefore an unbalanced panel,
spanning 140 observations from 15 cases. To estimate patterns in this data,
we ran several regression models with ﬁxed effects for states and election
years, and with standard errors clustered at the state level.19 Running these
types of models does not allow us to look for patterns that might explain the
differences in the average meeting activity between the states, but it does
allow us to see which characteristics of speciﬁc assemblies are correlated with
a higher or lower meeting activity than what is common in that state. Table 1
shows the output from these regression models. The main variable used for
measuring legislative activity in the assemblies was Average yearly number of
sittings, computed as an average of the number of days the assemblies met
each year while in power.20 The models include different explanatory vari-
ables in order to show how meeting activity correlated with a number of
factors. The continuous explanatory variables were standardized by subtracting
their mean and dividing by two standard deviations,21 so that the coefﬁcients
tell us the average change in the number of days an assembly met that is
associated with a two-standard-deviations increase in the explanatory variable.
The ﬁrst explanatory variable examined in Model 1, presented in Table 1,
is the political fragmentation of the assembly. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, one set of theories in political science suggests that greater party
19. This was done to account for state and time effects as well as time trends in the data. We ﬁrst
tested for the possibility that units might be correlated across time periods, and found no evidence
that this was the case. This gave us conﬁdence that the data did not exhibit serial correlation. We next
tested for whether a ﬁxed effects model or a random effects model would be more appropriate for the
regressions. With a large test statistic in the Hausman test we rejected the null hypothesis that the
random effects estimates were consistent and more efﬁcient. While state ﬁxed effects allow us to
account for heterogeneity across states, we still need to account for the possibility that errors within
states might be correlated. For this we used standard errors clustered at the state level.
20. In a few cases an assembly met for the last time during the same year as the next assembly met
for the ﬁrst time. In those cases we excluded those sessions from the averages, so that the averages
were based solely on years with only one assembly in power.
21. Using the Rescale function in the ‘‘arm’’ package in R.
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competition in the legislature should lead to more-intense debates and chal-
lenges, thus resulting in better accountability. Others, however, have argued
that higher levels of fragmentation might instead lead to chaos and inability
to legislate on key policies, leading to long and inefﬁcient legislative meetings
and greater delegation to party leaders instead. However, in India there has
been an overall decline in legislative activity during a time when the party
system became increasingly fragmented. Is there a negative correlation
between fragmentation and meeting activity at the state level as well?
The measure we use for fr agmentation is the effective number of parties
(ENOP), as calculated by Laakso and Taagepera and shown in Equation 1.22
table 1. Output from regression models.
Outcome variable: Average yearly number of sittings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effective number of parties –7.46*** –6.16*** –10.93*** –4.95*
(2.68) (2.28) (2.99) (2.67)
Coalition gov’t –0.10 2.94 –0.03
(1.98) (2.42) (2.11)
More than one CM –5.16*** –3.88* –4.74***
(1.72) (2.28) (1.82)
President’s rule –1.06 –2.87 –1.83
(2.86) (3.01) (2.89)
Caste fractionalization –4.31
(6.90)
Mean margin of victory –1.80
(1.91)
Electoral turnout 6.97
(4.79)
Mean number of electors –11.66*
(6.30)
Observations 140 140 98 140
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.12
***p > 0.01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
NOTE: The continuous explanatory variables have been standardized by subtracting their mean and
dividing by 2 standard deviations.
22. M. Laakso and R. Taagepera, ‘‘Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to
West Europe,’’ Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (1979), pp. 3–27.
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In the equation, p is the proportion of seats of party i in the legislative
assembly.
ENOP ¼ 1Pn
i¼1 p
2
i
ð1Þ
Across the 140 assemblies ENOP ranges from 1.4 to 7.4, with an average
of 2.8 and a standard deviation of 1.2. In Model 1 we ﬁnd a strong negative
correlation between ENOP and meeting activity in the assemblies. Since
the ENOP variable is standardized, the coefﬁcient means that a change of
two standard deviations in ENOP (for example from ENOP 2.8 to 5.2) is
associated with an average drop of 7.5 sittings in a year. This is a large drop,
considering that assemblies meet only 39 days per year, on average. The
model includes ﬁxed effects for states and election years, so this relationship
is not confounded by statewide differences in fragmentation and activity,
or by potential shocks to meeting activity caused by national events.
It may, however, be confounded by other characteristics of the assembly.
In the other models we explore some of these other potential explanatory
factors.
In Model 2 we add in characteristics of the state governments associated
with each assembly. Once an assembly has been elected, the governor
appoints a chief minister (CM) from the largest party in the assembly. The
CM and his or her cabinet must have the conﬁdence of the assembly to
remain in power. In cases where no party holds a majority of the seats in the
assembly, it is common for a coalition government to be formed with
members from several parties. But such coalitions sometimes break down,
necessitating the forming of a new coalition. At other times, the central
party leadership may intervene and change the CM in midterm. Such
political instability may affect the meeting activity of the legislature, and
may confound the association between fragmentation and the activity of the
assemblies.
In addition, political instability may lead to implementation of Presi-
dent’s Rule, preventing the legislature from meeting. To control for such
factors, we ﬁrst include a binary variable indicating whether the state was
ruled by a coalition or a single-party government, a binary variable for
whether there was more than one CM in power during the term of the
assembly, and an indicator for whether the assembly experienced President’s
Rule. The coalition variable is based on a dataset collected by Novosad and
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Asher;23 the CM variable is based on statewide lists of CMs collected from
the state archives and compared to the date of election of each assembly;
and the indicator for President’s Rule is based on the Wikipedia entry on
President’s Rule, which lists the dates when each state experienced it.24
Model 2 shows that neither having a coalition government in power nor
experiencing President’s Rule is strongly correlated with the number of sit-
tings in the assembly. This suggests that even when a legislature is prevented
from meeting because of President’s Rule, the members compensate by
meeting more, later on. For example, when the assembly in Andhra Pradesh
was prevented from meeting in 1973, its members ended up in an uncom-
monly long session from January 19 to August 17, 1974, meeting for a total of
68 days.
On the other hand, there is a strong negative relationship between mul-
tiple CMs being in power and the meeting activities of their legislatures. This
form of political instability might serve to absorb the attention of political
parties, preventing them from focusing on actual legislative work. Interest-
ingly, however, even when these other factors are controlled for, the negative
relationship between ENOP and number of sittings remains large and highly
statistically signiﬁcant.
Another important factor to take into consideration is the personal char-
acteristics of the members of the assembly. Here we have limited data, since
few systematic efforts have been made to examine the personal attributes of
Indian politicians over time. The main data collected have concerned the
caste proﬁles of politicians.25 Building on this information, Lee has collated
information about the proportion of legislators in various assemblies who
came from the Upper Castes, Intermediate Castes, Other Backward Castes,
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and minority groups (mainly Muslims
and Christians).26 The data spans 98 assemblies across 11 states.27 Using these
proportions, we calculated the caste fractionalization score of each assembly
23. Paul Novosad and Sam Asher, 2012, ‘‘Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from
India,’’ working paper, <http://www.nufﬁeld.ox.ac.uk/users/Asher/research.html>.
24. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President%27s_rule>, accessed June 15, 2013.
25. C. Jaffrelot and S. Kumar, Rise of the Plebeians? The Changing Face of Indian Legislative
Assemblies (London: Routledge, 2009).
26. Alexander Lee, Diversity and Power: Caste in Indian Politics, PhD thesis, Stanford University,
2013.
27.Of the large states of India, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Orissa are not included
in this dataset.
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using Equation 2, where s is the proportion of politicians from caste group i in
the assembly.28
FRAC ¼ 1
Xn
i¼1
S2i ð2Þ
The fractionalization score runs from 0 to 1, where 0 would mean that all
legislators were from the same caste category and 1 would mean that all came
from different caste categories. In the case of the 98 assemblies in the data,
the caste fractionalization score ranges from 0.52 to 0.83, with an average of
0.7. As we can see in Model 3, high caste fractionalization in an assembly is
associated with lower meeting activity, but this pattern is not statistically
signiﬁcant. However, both ENOP and the variable for multiple CMs remain
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively.
Finally, we explore how the pressures on individual legislatures might
affect activity in the assembly. After all, an assembly is a collection of
individual politicians, who are often interested in re-election. If parties
and candidates fear losing the next election they might be less willing to
spend time debating bills and more interested in returning to their home
constituencies. As noted, politicians in India spend much of their time
on constituency service, and both large electorates and tough political
competition may affect their willingness to give priority to legislative
work.
To measure electoral competitiveness at the constituency level, we took
constituency-level election data collated by Jensenius29 for each assembly over
time and calculated the Mean margin of victory for the members in each
assembly. We also included variables for two other factors that might incen-
tivize politicians to engage in legislative activity. The ﬁrst of these variables
was Electoral turnout in the election that had brought the assembly to power.
We expect to see better-performing legislative institutions when turnout was
high, since a more participatory electorate might be more demanding of its
elected ofﬁcials, making them feel pressured to focus on legislative work. The
second political variable was the average size of the electorate in each
28. Alberto Alesina et al., ‘‘Fractionalization,’’ Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (2003), 155–94.
29. Francesca Refsum Jensenius, Power, Performance and Bias: Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for
Scheduled Castes in India, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2013.
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constituency (Mean number of electors), calculated as the average number of
eligible voters in each assembly constituency in each state election. Due to the
freezing of political boundaries in India in 1976, state electoral boundaries
remained the same from 1974 until 2007. During that time, however, the
populations of the states (and different parts of states) continued to grow at
different rates. Over time, the electorates in constituencies across India have
therefore diverged in size. It might be that larger electorates make it difﬁcult
for politicians to have time to respond to requests from all their constituents,
making them more focused on constituency service than legislative work. It is
also possible that less contact with politicians makes it difﬁcult for constitu-
ents to hold their representatives accountable for their legislative perfor-
mance. Either way, we would expect less legislative activity in states with
more populous constituencies. Model 4 in Table 1 shows the output from
this model. Here we see thatMargin of victory is negatively correlated with the
meeting activity of the assemblies, but this correlation is not statistically
signiﬁcant. We also see that higher turnout is associated with more legislative
activity, giving credence to the idea that legislators may be responding to
pressures from an active electorate. However, although the coefﬁcient is large
it is also statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. On the other hand,
Electors per constituency emerges as strongly negatively related with the num-
ber of days the assemblies met, and this variable is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
An increase of two standard deviations in the average number of electors in
the constituencies is associated with 11 fewer sittings in a year. This suggests
that as the electoral constituencies of state assemblies grow in size, elected
ofﬁcials spend less time on legislative duties. Once again, though, we see that
both ENOP and having multiple governments in power remain statistically
signiﬁcant.
As to what these patterns may mean in terms of real-life politics, what we
see is that in non-competitive states, with one party dominating the assembly,
politicians are willing to spend time deliberating issues in the legislative
assembly. An example is Madhya Pradesh, where the INC has dominated
the assembly throughout most of the period studied. Here the level of frag-
mentation of the assembly has remained fairly constant over time, the size of
the constituencies has grown moderately (from about 62,000 to about
140,000 electors in each constituency between 1967 and 1998), and govern-
ments have been fairly stable. And in this case there has been a gradual
increase in legislative activity over time.
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On the other hand there is the assembly in Maharashtra, which used to be
dominated by the INC but became increasingly fragmented. After 1970,
every assembly had multiple CMs and most of the governments were coali-
tions. This occurred at the same time as a rapid growth in the size of the
electorate (from an average of 82,000 to 230,000 electors per constituency
between 1967 and 2004). Cutting debates short may be one way of avoiding
lengthy disagreements, and politicians have clearly faced greater pressure
from their home constituencies. And indeed, in Maharashtra we ﬁnd a dra-
matic decline in the yearly sittings of the assembly.
Thus we see that although party systems have become more fragmented
across India over time, this is not the case in every state; further, although all
constituencies have grown in size, this growth has been far from even. What
our ﬁndings suggest is that both the incentives of the individual legislators
and party concerns may affect the activities of state legislative assemblies. It is
clear that instability in the government and fragmentation of the assembly
will make parties and politicians more interested in spending their time
elsewhere.
5. CONCLUSION
Recent decades in Indian politics have witnessed a decline in the dominance
of the Indian National Congress, the rise of regional political parties, and an
increase in the political participation of marginalized caste groups across the
country. Political scientists and commentators alike have suggested that this
rapid mobilization of voters and the fragmentation of parties have acted to
hollow out political institutions, while also diminishing the actual policy
choices available to voters. On the other hand, a more engaged electorate
and a more fragmented party system could lead to more healthy debate in the
legislative assemblies, thereby strengthening the deliberative aspect of Indian
democracy.
The ﬁndings of our study of the patterns of legislative activity in Indian
states indicate that fragmentation has led to less activity in the assemblies.
From data on the meeting activities of the legislative assemblies in 15 Indian
states between 1967 and 2007, we see that in states with dominant parties and
low political competition, legislative activity is fairly high. Facing a low-
competition environment, both in the assembly and in the constituencies,
legislators seem willing to invest time in legislative activity. This was the
880  ASIAN SURVEY 55:5
situation when the INC dominated Indian politics. With the state assemblies
becoming more fragmented, much of the debate seems to have moved out of
the assemblies, and legislative meetings have become fewer and shorter. Our
ﬁndings also suggest that legislative institutions suffer when candidates and
parties ﬁnd themselves torn between legislative service and constituency
demands. Further exploring how candidates and parties choose to prioritize
different types of activities presents a promising agenda for future research.
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